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Abstract. Corporate governance is a concept where management supervision takes place in the decision-making process, both in
public and business organizations. This research reviews the effect of board characteristics (measured based on the independent
board of directors, dual leadership/CEO duality, board size, managerial ownership, board composition /multiple directorships,
board tenure, audit committee, and board interlock) on earning management in companies listed in the Indonesian Stock
Exchange during the 2004-2008 period. To identify earning management, the researcher uses the Jones model (1991) as modified
by Dechow and Sloan (1996) to separate non-discretionary accrual (NDAC) components from discretionary accrual components
(DAC) in the total accrual. The research shows that earning management takes place in companies listed in the Indonesian Stock
Exchange during the 2004-2008 period, be they companies in general, manufacturers, non-manufacturers, and companies that
use audit committee services. It is discovered that the independent board of directors, board size, managerial ownership, board
composition/multiple directorships, board tenure, and audit committee do not affect earning management practices in the above
companies; only dual leadership/CEO duality affects the earning management practices.
Keywords: corporate governance, earning management

INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance is a concept where management supervision takes place in the decision-making
process, both in public and business organizations. In
the decision-making process, corporate governance
must be implemented, as one of its requirements is a
firm and sound organizational management. Syakhroza
(2004) states that the leadership (board of commissioners and board of directors) quality plays a vital role
in the implementation of corporate governance. The
board of commissioners acts as the company supervisor, while the board of directors is responsible for the
company’s operational activities. Both boards have the
full responsibility and authority in deciding the means
to direct, control, and supervise the management of
resources in accordance with the company’s objectives. Nevertheless, a conflict of interest often arises
between them. Although the board of commissioners,
as the dispenser of authority, has a stronger legal position than the board of directors, it also has less access
to the information on the company’s situation. One of
the solutions is to use the financial report as an instrument in assessing the board of directors’ performance.
However, through specific methods, the board of directors often manipulates the financial report in the recording
of the company’s bookkeeping activities. In accounting

and financial practices, the manipulation is called
earning management. It is not a harmful practice, as it
is based on the belief that the board of directors should
present a good financial report with good records at
every period. Naturally, less or no earning management means more truthful information in the financial
report. The board of commissioners risks receiving a
financial report that the board of directors has manipulated, in order for the latter to receive commendation
for their performance. When this problem arises, the
board of commissioners can use the board of directors’s characteristics to assess their true performance.
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), the most
common reason for earning management is to improve
compensation and job security. They define earning
management as something that “occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying
economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported
accounting numbers.” Furthermore, they provide
the following descriptions for earning management:
(1) there are many ways that managers can exercise
judgment in financial reporting; (2) the objective of
earning management as being to mislead stakeholders
(or some class of stakeholders) about the underlying
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economic performance of the firm; and (3) management’s use of judgment in financial reporting has both
cost and benefits. The costs are the potential misallocation of resources that arises from earning management. Benefits include potential improvements in the
management’s credible communication of private
information to external stakeholders improving in
resource allocation decisions.
Earning management is also an anticipatory step
to avoid an in-default situation in a loan agreement,
reduce the regulatory cost, and increase the regulatory
benefit (Cornett et al., 2008). Simply put, the objective
of earning management practices is to obtain benefit
for the company. The benefit is linked to the management’s efforts in regulating certain incomes or profits for certain purposes that are directly or indirectly
related to the company’s interests. Schipper (1989)
defines earning management as “disclosure management in the sense of purposeful intervention in the
external reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain.” Ayres (1994) defines profit
management as “an intentional structuring of reporting or production/investment decisions around the
bottom line impact. It encompasses income smoothing
behavior but also includes any attempt to alter reported
income that would not occur unless management were
concerned with the financial reporting implications.”
Based on these two definitions, we can conclude that
earning management has two interrelated aspects.
First, due to misallocation of the company’s potential
resources, earning management can lead to extra costs
for the company. Second, earning management can
become a positive factor when the management is able
to utilize it for the company’s benefit. Rosenzweig and
Fischer (1994) in Gumanti (2000) states that earning
management consists of “the actions of manager that
are intended to increase (decrease) current reported
earnings of the unit for which the manager is responsible without generating a corresponding increase
(decrease) in the long-term economic profitability of
the unit.”
The board of commissioners’ independence and
the audit committee’s existence contribute to corporate governance. The two factors are the main focus
for Indonesia’s Securities and Exchange Commision
and Regulator, namely the Jakarta Stock Market and
Bapepam (Indonesian Capital Market and Financial
Institution Supervisory Agency). Another mechanism that becomes the focus in the implementation of
corporate governance is the stock ownership structure.
Institutional stock ownership and insider/managerial
stock ownership may become a supervisory mecha-
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nism that reduces the amount of asymmetric information between investor and insider. Leverage policy
and independent auditors can also impose an external
supervisory mechanism that limits the moral hazard
for insiders.
Fama and Jensen (1983) believe that the board of
commissioners is a vital element in implementing
corporate governance; essentially, it is implemented
in order to protect and supervise the investors’ assets,
and no supervisory mechanism, even delegating the
supervision to other parties, is more effective than
direct supervision by stockholders. According to Klein
(2002), an independent board of directors can run a
more effective supervision. Cornett et al. (2008) state
that operational performance and stock return will
improve as the number of independent commissioners
increases. Liu and Lu (2007) state that board structure
does not only control the financial reporting process,
but also prevents controlling shareholders from doing
activities that may harm other stockholders. In addition, Beasley (1996) discovers that financial report
manipulation decreases in companies where the board
of commissioners have more members. Alonso et al.
(2000) discover a positive connection between the
number of members in the board of directors and
earning management practices. Anderson, Mansi
and Reeb (2003) discover a lower cost of debt in
companies where the board of commissioners have
more members. Next, Weir, et al. (2002) and Ho dan
Williams (2003) believe that board effectiveness tends
to increase when the company has non-executive
directors (equivalent to independent commissioners),
as non-executive directors have more independence in
the management (Mangena, 2007). A study by Anderson, Mansi, dan Reeb (2003) also finds that board
tenure is positively linked to corporate debt yield.
This shows that effective supervision is most probably
caused by the company board’s abilities, implying that
a board with a long tenure tends to run a good supervision in order to achieve the company’s goals (Beasley,
1996 in Anderson, et al., 2003).
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality indicates a
manager’s dual role in the company. The phenomenon is
described by Gul and Leung (2004), Booth, et al. (2004),
and Ho and Wong (2001). They state that the CEO duality phenomenon enables a manager to simultaneously
occupy two positions: the CEO and the chairperson of the
board. The duality also results in power concentration in
the hand of one leader, which will lead to management
discretion. Research by Cornett at al. (2008) reveals that
the separation of CEO and board chairperson will encourage a more efficient and effective supervision. Balinga,
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Moyer and Rao (1996) find that CEO duality has a negative effect on market performance. This statement is
augmented by Daily and Dalton (1997), who discover
CEO duality’s negative effect on company performance.
In relation to board size, Fatma (2008) discovers that it has
a positive effect on company leverage - specifically, in real
estate and property companies listed in the Indonesian Stock
Exchange. The separation of ownership from management leads to a conflict of interest between them. The
manager, supposedly the agent that works to optimize
investor interest, has a personal agenda to improve their
own well-being, using resources that rightfully belong
to the investors. Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that
the incentive for the management to act in accordance
with the investors’ wishes is influenced by the level of
corporate stock ownership in the management itself.
Managers with corporate stocks have the same objectives
as the other stockholders; this will control the management’s internal behavior. The more stocks the management owns, the further its objective will match the stockholders’. Ang et al. (2000) finds no agency fees in single
owner-manager companies, whereas agency fees are
found in companies where the manager owns less than
100% of the stocks. Thus it can be concluded that agency
fees are negatively linked to the ownership percentage;
the more non-manager shareholders there are, the higher
the agency fees.
Board composition refers to the number of independent commissioners in comparison with the total of the
board of commissioners’ members. The board composition must enable an effective, accurate, and fast decisionmaking. Independent commissioners have the task to
ensure a balanced decision-making, especially to protect
minority stockholders and other relevant parties.
Board tenure is a board’s tenure in the company. The
tenure will provide the board with the experience and
abilities to control and supervise the company’s activities. This in turn will support the board’s effectiveness
in doing its functions in the company, and this is an
important part of corporate governance which ensures the
implementation of company strategies, supervision of the
management in their tasks, and accountability.
Independent auditors are responsible for external supervision. They examine financial reports from the corporation and then give their assessment of the reports. They
are expected to notice inconsistencies in the reports and
report these inconsistencies to the board of commissioners or audit committee. The audit committee’s presence
alone may reduce earning management practices (Klein,
2002). This is in accordance with Lin’s (2006) research,
which reveals that an audit committee may reduce the
company management’s earning management practices.
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Board interlock occurs when a board implements interlocking directorship in the company. Interlocking directorship refers to a board in one company that also functions
as a board in another. The board may be the supervisory
board in one company and the management board in
another. Interlocking directorship contributes positively
to a company, in that the company will receive more
information on its external environments. The research
by Rommens, Cuyvers and Deloof (2007) discovers a
significantly negative connection between board interlock
and company leverage. The research also finds that a board
from a company with a high leverage is a rather unattractive board candidate for other companies (Rommens,
Cuyvers and Deloof, 2007).
The research aims to estimate the effect of board characteristics (measured based on the independent board of
directors, dual leadership/CEO duality, board size, managerial ownership, board composition/multiple directorships, board tenure, audit committee, and board interlock)
on earning management in companies listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange during the 2004-2008 period. To
detect earning management, the researcher uses the Jones
model (1991) as modified by Dechow and Sloan (1996) to
separate non-discretionary accrual (NDAC) components
from discretionary accrual components (DAC) in the total
accrual. The research is limited by concepts related to
board characteristics, measured based on the independent
board of directors, dual leadership/CEO duality, board
size, managerial ownership, board composition/multiple
directorships, board tenure, audit committee, and board
interlock. It is our hope that the research will provide both
a theoretical contribution (from the business and administrative perspective) and a practical one. Theoretically, the
research is intended to provide a complete overview of the
earning management and corporate governance concepts.
Practically, the research is intended to provide an actual
contribution to the development of reviews related to
earning management and to the anticipatory steps to
reduce it taken by corporations that implement corporate
governance.
METHODOLOGY
The research uses the quantitative approach and
secondary data obtained from various sources. It is an
explanatory research, examining the connection between
dependent variables (earning management) and independent variables (board characteristics). The population
taken as the samples consists of all the companies listed
in the Indonesian Stock Exchange during the 2004-2008
period. The researcher uses the non-probability sampling
technique and purposive sampling method. The popula-
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Table 1. Operationalizing the Concept
No

Variable

Definition
A number of people appointed by stockholders to hold the highest
authority in a corporation, to establish the policies for corporate
activities.
A manager’s dual role in a company.

1

Independent Board of Director
(Independent BOD)

2

CEO Duality

3

Board Size

A board’s size/number of members. As the board occupies the
highest rank in the internal management system, it is tasked with
supervising and controlling the company.

4

Managerial Ownership

The number of stocks owned by the management, board of directors,
or board of commissioners.

5

Board Composition

The number of independent commissioners in comparison with the
board of commissioners’ total members. The board composition
must enable an effective, accurate, and fast decision-making.

6

Board Tenure

A board’s tenure in a company, or the period during which the board
occupies its position.

7

Board Interlock

A board involved in interlocking directorship.

8

Audit Committee

Independent auditors tasked with external supervision.

tion taken as the samples meets the following criteria: (1)
Their stocks are not part of the financial industry, as such
stocks are highly regulated and characteristically different from stocks in other industries; for instance, in their
capital structure and presentation of financial report; (2)
The companies taken as samples have complete financial
reports which contain all the variables required in this
particular research model.
To identify earning management, the research uses the
Jones model (1991) as modified by Dechow and Sloan
(1996), referred to as the m-Jones model, to separate nondiscretionary accrual (NDAC) components from discretionary accrual components (DAC) in the total accrual.
Below are the stages to obtain the DAC value:
1.
Counting the total accrual value (TACC) using the
following formula:
TACC = Net Income – Cash Flow from Operation		
………....….(1)
(Source: Teoh et al., 1998)
2. Counting the values of NDAC and DAC by
inserting the TACC value into the m-Jones regression
equation.
 1 
 ÄREVit − ÄRECit 
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Basically, the m-Jones model is a weighted least
square model that aims to obtain the values for a1, a2, and
a3. Based on the coefficients in the regression (a1, a2, and
a3), non-discretionary accrual and discretionary accrual
components in each issuer used as a research sample are

separated. As the income or sales (REV) and fixed assets
value (PPE) components indicate business growth, the
accrual values in the components are considered normal
and not categorized as management discretion. Therefore,
the NDAC value calculation uses the following formula
(Teoh et al., 1998):
 1 
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				 .....................(3)
3. Counting the DAC value using the following
equation (Teoh et al., 1998):
TACC
DACit =

T
A

it

it −1

− NDAC

...................(4)
where:
TACCit = Total accrual of issuer i on year t
NDACit = Non-discretionary accruals for issuer i on
year t
DACit = Discretionary accruals for issuer i on year t
ΔREVit = Change in income value for issuer i on year
t compared to years t-l
ΔRECit = Change in account receivable for issuer i on
year t compared to years t-l
PPEit
= Fixed assets value for issuer i on year t
TAit -1 = Fixed assets value for issuer i on year t
Aggressive earning management is based on the discretion or judgment of the manager as the person who presents the profit report. After the discretionary and nondiscretionary accrual values have been separated, the
next step is to regress the discretionary accrual value with

5

NUGROHO & EKO, BOARD CHARACTERISTIC AND EARNING MANAGEMENT

Table 2. Statistical description of companies listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange during the 2004-2008
period
EM

Ind_BOD

CEO_Dual

B_Size

Mgr_Own

B_Comp

B_Tenr

B_Intr

0.0666

1.3764

0.1170

4.1755

0.0180

0.3275

0.0887

0.0896

0.0090

0.0542

0.0159

0.1152

0.0030

0.0082

0.0098

0.0197

0.0620
-.37558a

1
1

0
0

3.60E+00
3

0.00012
0

0.33
0.33

0
0

0
0

Std. Deviation

0.1311

0.7885

0.2318

1.6771

0.0439

0.1192

0.1420

0.2863

Variance

0.0170

0.6220

0.0540

2.8130

0.0020

0.0140

0.0200

0.0820

Range

1.3373

5

1

9

0.25719

0.67

0.6

1

Minimum

-0.3756

0

0

2

0

0

0

0

Maximum

0.9617

5

1

11.00

0.26

0.67

0.60

1

Sum

14.1249

2.9E+02

24.80

885.20

3.81

69.43

18.80

19.00

212

212

212

212

212

Mean
Std. Error of
Mean
Median
Mode

a.

N
212
212
212
Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown

the constitutive variables for the corporate governance’s
characteristics.
Below is the analysis model used in this research:
DAJi,t =β0 + β1InBOD + β2DUAL + β3BSIZE + β4MO +
β5BC + β6BT + β7AUD + β8BI + є
where:
DAC		
= Discretionary accrual
InBOD		
= Independent board of director
DUAL		
= Dual leadership/CEO duality
BSIZE		
= Board size
MO		
= Managerial ownership
BC		
= Board composition
BT		
= Board tenure
AUD		
= Audit committee
BI		
= Board interlock
The hypotheses in this research are:
1. Earning management practices exist in companies
listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange during the
2004-2008 period.
2. The independent board of directors is negatively
linked to earning management.
3. The dual leadership/CEO duality is positively linked
to earning management.
4. Board size is negatively linked to earning management.
5. Managerial ownership is negatively linked to earning
management.
6. Board composition/multiple directorships is negatively linked to earning management.
7. Board tenure is negatively linked to earning management.
8. The audit committee is negatively linked to earning

9.

1.
2.

3.
4.

5.
6.
7.

management.
Board interlock is positively linked to earning
management.
Below are the stages in this research:
Collecting research samples, namely from companies listed at the Indonesian Stock Exchange during
the 2001-2006 period.
Eliminating several samples with the purposive
sampling method. The criteria for the elimination are
companies that: (1) are in the financial industry, and
(2) do not have the required variables for the research.
Listing the earning management variables data in a
Microsoft Excel document.
Calculating the total accrual, non-discretionary
accrual, and discretionary accrual values using the
m-Jones model and the following softwares: EViews
and Microsoft Excel.
Listing the corporate governance variables data in a
Microsoft Excel document
Pooling the data to test the hypothesis testing model
using EViews.
Analyzing research results and drawing conclusions
from the research.
RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Statistical description of companies listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange during the 2004-2008 period
Using the purposive sampling method, the research
has collected samples that consist of 212 companies. The
following table shows the statistical description of all the
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Table 3. Statistical Description: Discretionary Accrual Values
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

0.0666
0.0090
0.0620
#N/A
0.1311
0.0172
12.7335
1.8436
1.3373
-0.3756
0.9617
14.1249
212

Table 4. Testing the earning management practices

EM

T

df

Sig. (2-tailed)

Mean Difference

7.403

211

.000

.06662710

95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
Lower
Upper
.0488845

.0843697

Table 5. Model Summary
R

R Square

Adjusted R
Square

Std. Error of the
Estimate

Durbin-Watson

.012

.000

-.005

.13135210

2.152

.133

.018

.013

.13019321

2.165

.044

.002

-.003

.13123745

2.144

.025

.001

-.004

.13132206

2.153

Board Composition on Earning Management .043

.002

-.003

.13123957

2.156

Board Tenure on Earning Management

.032

.001

-.004

.13129624

2.156

Board Interlock on Earning Management

.074

.005

.001

.13100128

2.151

Independent Variables on Earning
Management

.158

.025

-.008

.13160164

2.157

Multivariate Testing

.154

.024

.005

.13072975

2.163

Independent Board of Director on Earning
Management
Dual Leadership/CEO Duality on Earning
Management
Board Size on Earning Management
Managerial Ownership on Earning
Management

a Predictors: (Constant), Ind_BOD
b Dependent Variable: EM
variables used in this research.
Table 2 shows the median value of the earning
management to be 0.0666 and 0.0620, with a maximum
value of 0.9617 and a minimum value of -0.3756. These
values indicate that, in their earning management practices, the companies tend more toward income increasing
than income decreasing. This can be seen from the positive discretionary accrual values (Table 3). The average
discretionary accrual value is 0.0666, with a maximum
value of 0.9617 and a minimum value of -0.3756. The
positive discretionary accrual value indicates the compa-

nies’ effort to show a good performance, in the hope of
attracting investors into making short-term and long-term
investments.
The independent board of commissioners (Ind_Bod)
refers to the number of independent commissioners in
a company. The mean value is 1.3764, with a maximum
value of 5 and a minimum value of 0. CEO duality indicates a manager’s dual role in a company. 1 is given as
a score when the manager in a company has a dual role,
and 0 is given when the manager does not have a dual
role. The mean value for CEO duality is 0.1170, with a
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Table 6. Anova

Independent Board of Director on
Earning Management
Dual Leadership/CEO Duality on
Earning Management
Board Size on Earning Management

Regression
Residual
Total
Regression
Residual
Total
Regression
Residual

Total
Regression
Managerial Ownership on Earning
Residual
Management
Total
Regression
Board Composition on Earning
Residual
Management
Total
Regression
Board Tenure on Earning ManagementResidual
Total
Regression
Board Interlock on Earning
Residual
Management
Total
Regression
Independent Variables on Earning
Residual
Management
Total
Regression
Residual
Multivariate Testing
Total

Sum of
Squares
.001
3.623
3.624
.064
3.560
3.624
.007
3.617

Df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

1
210
211
1
210
211
1
210

.001
.017

.032

.858

.064
.017

3.788

.053

.007
.017

.399

.528

3.624
.002
3.622
3.624
.007
3.617
3.624
.004
3.620
3.624
.020
3.604
3.624
.091
3.533
3.624
.086
3.538

211
1
210
211
1
210
211
1
210
211
1
210
211
7
204
211
4
207

.002
.017

.128

.721

.007
.017

.392

.532

.004
.017

.211

.647

.020
.017

1.159

.283

.013
.017

.748

.632

.022
.017

1.259

.287

3.624

211

a Predictors: (Constant), Ind_BOD
b Dependent Variable: EM
maximum value of 1 and a minimum value of 0.
Board size refers to a board’s size or the number of its
members. In the samples, the mean value for board size
is 4.1755, with a maximum value of 11 and a minimum
value of 2. Managerial ownership refers to the number of
stocks owned by the company’s management, board of
directors, or board of commissioners. The mean value for
the number of stocks owned by the company’s management, board of directors, or board of commissioners is
0.018 or 1.8%, with a maximum value of 1.26 (26%) and
a minimum value of 0 (0%). This indicates that basically,
in the samples, the management, board of directors, or
board of commissioners have a managerial ownership of
1.8%.
Board composition refers to the number of independent
commissioners in comparison with the board of commissioners’ total members. The mean value for the number of
independent commissioners in comparison with the board
of commissioners’ total members is 0.3275 (32.75%),

with a maximum value of 0.67 (67%) and a minimum
value of 0 (0%). 0 means a company does not have any
independent commissioners, while 0.67 shows that 67%
of a company’s commissioners are independent.
Board tenure refers to a board’s tenure in the company.
The tenure will provide the board with the experience and
abilities to control and supervise the company’s activities.
The mean value for a board of commissioners’ tenure is
0.0887, with a maximum value of 0.60 and a minimum
value of 0.
Board interlock refers to a board that practices interlocking directorship, that is, a board in one company also
functions as a board in another. The board may be the
supervisory board in one company and the management
board in another. The mean value for board interlock is
0.0896 (8.96%), with a maximum value of 1 (100%) and
a minumum value of 0 (0%). This indicates that basically
a commissioner’s involvement in another company is
very small, thus they can concentrate on improving their
first company’s performance.
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Table 7. Multivariate Testing
Model

1

Non-standardized
Coefficients
B
Std. Error

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta

T

Sig.

.944

.346

Collinearity Statistics
Tolerance

VIF

(Constant)

.064

.068

Ind_BOD
CEO_Dual

-.003
-.071

.045
.040

-.021
-.125

-.077
-1.766

.939
.079

.066
.953

15.252
1.050

B_Size

.003

.017

.044

.205

.838

.103

9.721

.051
-.015
.026
.029

.209
.181
.065
.034

.017
-.014
.028
.064

.246
-.085
.403
.876

.806
.932
.687
.382

.977
.176
.958
.884

1.024
5.689
1.044
1.131

Mgr_Own
B_Comp
B_Tenr
B_Intr
a. Dependent Variable: EM

Testing the Research’s Hypotheses on Companies
Listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange During the
2004-2008 Period
The research shows that earning management practices exist in companies listed in the Indonesian Stock
Exchange during the 2004-2008 period, as evinced by the
significance value (0.000) which indicates these practices. The companies tend more toward income increasing
than income decreasing, in the hope of attracting investors into making short-term and long-term investments.
The Effect of Board Characteristics on Earning
Management in Companies Listed in the Indonesian
Stock Exchange During 2004-2008 Period
The researcher processes the data from the research on
the effect of the independent board of director, dual leadership/CEO duality, board size, managerial ownership,
board composition/multiple directorships, board tenure,
and board interlock on earning management in companies
listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange during the 20042008 period. Then the data is presented in the following
model summary and anova (analysis of variance) table.
The Effect of the Independent Board of Director on
Earning Management
The independent board of director’s presence does not
show a significant effect on earning management practices, as evinced by the significance values in Table 5
(0.858 with a correlational value of 0.012). These values
indicate that independent commissioners are not yet capable of providing a significant supervision over the company’s managemental activities. In general, the appointment of the independent commissioners by the company
is based on the company’s interests, instead of on the
commissioners’ personal abilities and professionalism.
The commissioners’ level of independence still needs
further examination, especially in relation to their abilities to supervise the company’s managemental activities.

Results also show that the independent commissioners are
positively linked to earning management practices, with a
correlational value of 0.012 or 1.2 %. The values indicate
a very weak correlation between the two variables, thus
independent commissioners do not significantly influence
earning management practices in companies reviewed in
this research.
The Effect of Dual Leadership/CEO Duality on Earning Management
Dual leadership/CEO duality shows a significant effect
on earning management practices (the significance value
in Table 6 is 0.053, with a correlational value of 0.133
in Table 5). This indicates that a manager’s dual role in
a company opens the way to earning management practices, revealing that power concentration in a manager’s
hand, or the dual role, makes it possible for the manager
to practice earning management, in the form of income
increasing and income decreasing.
The Effect of Board Size on Earning Management
Board size does not show a significant effect on earning management practices (the significance value in Table
6 is 0.528, with a correlational value of 0.044 in Table 5).
This shows that the number of the board of commissioners’ members in a company - whether there are few or
many members - does not influence earning management
practices. Such findings are contrary to the researches
done by Xie, et al. (2003) and Chtourou, et al. (2001),
which state that the more members a board of commisioners has, the more possible it is to reduce earning management practices.
The Effect of Managerial Ownership on Earning
Management
Managerial ownership does not show a significant
effect on earning management practices (the significance
value in Table 6 is 0.721, with a correlational value of
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0.025 in Table 5). Managerial ownership represents the
number of stocks owned by the company’s management,
board of directors, or board of commissioners. The fact of
the insignificant influence is reinforced by the finding that
the average percentage of stocks owned by the company’s
management, board of directors, or board of commissioners is 0.018 or 1.8%; thus, it can be said that the number
of those stocks is insignificant in comparison with the
total number of stocks in the company.
The Effect of Board Composition/Multiple Directorships on Earning Management
Board composition/multiple directorships does not
show a significant effect on earning management practices (the significance value in Table 6 is 0.532, with a
correlational value of 0.043 in Table 5). Board composition represents the number of independent commissioners in comparison with the total number of the board
of commissioners’ members; they do not directly influence earning management practices. Therefore, it can
be inferred that independent commissioners have not
wholly contributed to good managemental activities in a
company.
The Effect of Board Tenure on Earning Management
Board tenure does not show a significant effect on earning management practices (the significance value in Table
6 is 0.647, with a correlational value of 0.032 in Table
5). Board tenure refers to a board’s tenure in a company.
The tenure will provide the board with the experience and
abilities to control and supervise the company’s activities;
however, the experience and abilities have not significantly
reduced earning management practices in the company.
The Effect of Board Interlock on Earning Management
Board interlock does not show a significant effect on
earning management practices (the significance value in
Table 6 is 0.283, with a correlational value of 0.074 in
Table 5). Board interlock refers to the existence of interlocking directorship in the company.
Overall Testing of the Research Variables
Research results show that board characteristics (the
independent board of director, dual leadership/CEO duality, board size, managerial ownership, board composition/
multiple directorships, board tenure, and board interlock)
do not significantly effect earning management in companies listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange in the 20042008 period (the significance value in Table 6 is 0.632,
with a correlational value of 0.158 in Table 5). Due to this
evidence of insignificance, the researcher will re-test all
independent variables with VIFs higher than 5, in order
to prevent multi-collinearity among the independent variables.
According to Table 7, three independent variables
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must be taken out as their VIFs are higher than 5: independent board of director, board size, and board composition/multiple directorships.
After all the variables are tested, the result shows that
dual leadership/CEO duality, managerial ownership,
board tenure, and board interlock do not significantly
influence earning management in companies listed in the
Indonesian Stock Exchange in the 2004-2008 period (the
significance value in Table 6 is 0.287, with a correlational
value of 0.154 in Table 5).
CONCLUSION
Board characteristics (independent board of director, dual leadership/CEO duality, board size, managerial
ownership, board composition/multiple directorships,
board tenure, and audit committee) do not significantly
influence earning management practices in companies
listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange in the 2004-2008
period. Only dual leadership/CEO duality has an effect on
earning management practices in these companies. Therefore, audit committee needs to be added as a classification
criteria for companies that use both Big Four and non-Big
Four auditors. Further research on manufacturing companies is required, with a longer period of research, so that
it will focus more on reviewing the independent variables
that influence earning management.
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